![]() If people do not help others when they could, or fail to return a good deed, we may call them uncharitable or ungrateful. ![]() As Smith comments, it is possible for a society of robbers and murderers to exist – but only insofar as they abstain from robbing and murdering each other. For society to survive, there must be rules to present its individual members harming each other. It is almost as if an invisible hand were guiding what we do. Nature has equipped us with appetites and aversions that promote the continued existence of our species and our society. We approve and reward acts that benefit society, and disapprove and punish acts that harm it. Punishments and rewards have an important social function. The impartial spectator is only imaginary, but still guides us: and through experience we gradually build up a system of behavioural rules – morality. Likewise, when we show concern for other people, we know that an impartial spectator would approve, and we take pleasure from it. In fact, we aim to temper them to the point where any typical, disinterested person – an impartial spectator, says Smith – would empathise with us. So we try to curb our emotions to bring them into line with those of others. And through our natural empathy with others, we learn that an excess of anger, or grief, or other emotions distresses them. Of course, we do not feel others’ emotions as strongly as they do. ![]() We derive pleasure when people do things we approve of, and distress when we believe they are doing harm. When we see people happy or sad, we feel happy or sad too. It is natural, built into us as social beings. Morality, says Smith, is not something we have to calculate. That requires self-command, and in this lies true virtue. ![]() However, the ideal must be that any impartial person, real or imaginary – what Smith calls an impartial spectator – would fully empathise with our emotions and actions. Prudence, justice, and beneficence are important. If people go further and do positive good – beneficence – we welcome it, but cannot demand such action as we demand justice. That is an essential minimum for the survival of society. Though we are self-interested, we again have to work out how to live alongside others without doing them harm. Gradually, as we grow from childhood to adulthood, we each learn what is and is not acceptable to other people. When their feelings are particularly strong, empathy prompts them to restrain their emotions so as to bring them into line with our, less intense reactions. Likewise, others seek our empathy and feel for us. When we see others distressed or happy, we feel for them – albeit less strongly. And yet as social creatures, explains Smith, we are also endowed with a natural sympathy – today we would say empathy – towards others. As individuals, we have a natural tendency to look after ourselves. It identifies the basic rules of prudence and justice that are needed for society to survive, and explains the additional, beneficent, actions that enable it to flourish. It argues that this social psychology is a better guide to moral action than is reason. It shows that our moral ideas and actions are a product of our very nature as social creatures. The Theory Of Moral Sentiments was a real scientific breakthrough. The Theory of Moral Sentiments Eamonn Butler's Condensed Wealth of Nations, which includes a section on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, is available to download here.
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